| In the section | From the Chief Editor |
| Title of the article | Russian Crisis: Expectations Against Facts |
| Pages | 7–15 |
| Author | Pavel Aleksandrovich Minakir Academician RAS, Doctor of Economics, Professor, Research Supervisor Economic Research Institute FEB RAS 153 Tikhookeanskaya Street, Khabarovsk, Russia, 680042 This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. ORCID: 0000-0002-5451-5662 |
| Abstract | 2015–2016 turned out to be the period of the most prolonged decline in the latest Russian economic history (not counting the transformation crisis of the 1990s). By the end of 2016 there were signs of the end of the crisis, and in 2017 it seemed to have given grounds to believe that the crisis was overcome. To what extent have the system problems of the domestic economy really been overcome and external shocks, which acted as a catalyst for the structural and institutional failures that form the fundamental basis of the crisis, have been leveled? This article is devoted to the discussion of this question. The article analyzed expert estimates and statistics for 2017. It is shown that the expectations of overcoming the crisis are conflicting with objective indicators of economic dynamics. This is manifested in the following. First, in the low ability to self-generation of economic growth. Although the multiplier of output in the economy as a whole increased somewhat after the catastrophic decrease by 2000 compared to 1990 (to 1.35 against 2.0), it remains low (1.93). It is explained considerably by the primitiveness of the Russian economy that saw the decrease in the level of intra-industrial interactions and the length of added value chains at the beginning of the crisis compared to the beginning of 1980s, although the opposite is seen in the advanced economies. Second, the constant institutional shell that remains the biggest problematic sphere when looking at transition to economy of growth that generates the increase in the quality of life. The simultaneous solution to the two-part problem: saving the ‘stability’ of institutional and providing the dynamic development of economy and society – appears to be impossible |
| Code | 330+336+338 |
| JEL | Е02, Е42, Е64 |
| DOI | 10.14530/se.2018.1.007-015 |
| Keywords | crisis ♦ growth rates ♦ structure ♦ accumulation ♦ consumption ♦ external trade ♦ Russia |
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| For citation | Minakir P.A. Russian Crisis: Expectations Against Facts. Prostranstvennaya Ekonomika = Spatial Economics, 2018, no. 1, pp. 7–15. DOI: 10.14530/se.2018.1.007-015. (In Russian). |
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