In the section Surveys
Title of the article Research on Spatial Economic Interactions: A Cooperative Game Theory Approach
Pages 144-162
Author Natalya Gennadievna Dzhurka
Candidate of Sciences (Economics), Senior Research Fellow
Economic Research Institute FEB RAS
153 Tikhookeanskaya St., Khabarovsk, 680042, Russian Federation
Senior Research Fellow
Institute of Economics RAS
32 Nakhimovsky Prospect, Moscow, 117218, Russian Federation
This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
ORCID: 0000-0001-9242-5636
Abstract The article is dedicated to describing the capabilities of the cooperative game theory for studying spatial distribution of economic activity. The paper discusses the features of cooperative games the spatial connotation of which drives from the fact that they formalize the conflict between the forces aimed at concentration of economic activity, and the forces aimed at its dispersion (hereinafter ‘the fundamental conflict’). The author proposes a classification of spatial cooperative games based on: 1) the method of specifying the set of players, 2) the type of solution to the fundamental conflict. The players in the models under consideration are the elements of the economic space with either a simple or a complex structure. The elements with a simple structure are economic agents with their objective functions deriving from their rational choices. The elements with a complex structure are aggregates, such as regions, economic areas, or countries. If we consider it possible to describe objective functions for such players, we should use the functions incorporating a great range of decisions made by different economic agents. The article pays special attention to justification of the usage of spatial cooperative games to model interactions between the elements of the economic space with a complex structure. In spatial cooperative games, the fundamental conflict is solved either by creating a spatial projection of economic interactions, and picking the player’s locations or by studying the delocalization of economic interactions and evaluating the coalition productivity of players. The author distinguishes four types of spatial cooperative games and for each class gives an example of a specific application of the game model. Within the given classification, the author studies game models of distribution networks, interregional interactions, service facilities location, spatial growth, and production planning for spatially concentrated firms. The conclusion is that even though spatial cooperative games are used for research on various levels of generalization, they are, first of all, useful as a means of researching the phenomena of economic activity delocalization. Thus, as far as the location theory is concerned, the games act rather as a tool that complements the optimization calculations with evaluations of stability of the obtained solutions to coalitional and migration threats. From the standpoint of the concept of interregional interactions it acts as an independent tool significant for assessing system effects and their distribution between different elements of the economic space. Furthermore, the author suggests that the future of cooperative games as a tool for research on spatial distribution of economic activity is associated with the search for statements that connect the results of analysis of economic space elements with a simple and complex structure
Code 330.4+332.1
JEL C70, C71, R19
DOI https://dx.doi.org/10.14530/se.2021.1.144-162
Keywords cooperative game ♦ economic space ♦ system effect ♦ classification ♦ distribution network model ♦ interregional interactions model ♦ facility location problem ♦ cluster game ♦ spatial economic growth model
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For citation Dzhurka N.G. Research on Spatial Economic Interactions: A Cooperative Game Theory Approach. Prostranstvennaya Ekonomika = Spatial Economics, 2021, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 144–162. https://dx.doi.org/10.14530/se.2021.1.144-162 (In Russian)
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Submitted 24.12.2020
Revised 10.02.2021
Published online 30.03.2021

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