| In the section | Articles |
| Title of the article | Introduction to the General Theory of Defects of the Mixed Economy |
| Pages | 7-12 |
| Author 1 | Alexander Yakovlevich Rubinstein Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor, Head of Research Project Institute of Economics RAS 32, Nakhimovskiy Prospect, Moscow, Russia, 117218 arubin@This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. |
| Abstract | The author gives a new perspective on defects of the mixed economy in the context of nature and evolution of paternalism as one of elements of the theory of patronized goods. The researcher supplements standard market failures with ‘behavioral failure’, which is a direct consequence of irrational behavior of individuals, and ‘paternalistic failure’, which occurs as a result of erroneous actions of the state. The article also discusses the formation of paternalistic attitudes and reviews theoretical and applied aspects of liberalization of making political and economic decisions based on the development of civil society institutions and civic engagement aimed at reducing the risks of ‘government failures’ and welfare loss. |
| Code | 330 |
| DOI | 10.14530/se.2016.4.013-032 |
| Keywords | ♦ patronized goods ♦ meritorious goods ♦ market failures ♦ paternalism ♦ libertarian paternalism ♦ state activity ♦ paternalistic failure ♦ government failures ♦ institutions |
| Download | SE.2016.4.013-032.Rubinstein.pdf |
| For citation | Rubinstein A.Y. Introduction to the General Theory of Defects of the Mixed Economy. Prostranstvennaya Ekonomika = Spatial Economics, 2016, no. 4, pp. 7-12. DOI: 10.14530/se.2016.4.013-032. (In Russian). |
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